America’s Long Game: Profiting From Wars
Modern geopolitics often appears chaotic, but history suggests that major powers rarely act without long-term strategic and economic calculation. Viewed through this lens, the United States’ role in current and potential future large-scale conflicts, particularly in Europe and the Middle East can be interpreted less as reactive and more as methodically opportunistic.
A hypothetical war between the European Union and Russia based upon current real world tensions would likely follow a familiar pattern. While catastrophic for those directly involved, such a conflict would almost certainly devolve into a prolonged war of attrition. Neither side could achieve a swift, decisive victory. Cities, infrastructure, industry, and populations would be ground down over years rather than months.
The United States, as it has in previous global conflicts, would likely remain formally distant in the early stages. Rather than immediate, direct military intervention, it would supply weapons, equipment and logistical support. Financed through loans, aid packages, and lend-lease-style agreements. These arrangements historically come with conditions, access to resources, favourable trade terms, and long-term financial and political leverage. By the time direct American military involvement occurs, if it occurs at all, the opposing powers would already be significantly weakened by the EU States involved in a conflict in Europe.
Britain’s position reinforces this dynamic. Now purely coincidentally outside the European Union, the UK is no longer legally bound to defend EU member states. This allows selective participation rather than total commitment. At the same time, Britain’s geography makes it an ideal staging ground for any future US led European campaign. As in the past, the UK paying heavily, financially and politically for American protection and support in return for help fighting a potential Russian onslaught should the EU lose territory.
In parallel, conflict in the Middle East would serve as a strategic distraction. A major escalation involving Israel could draw the attention and resources of Russian-aligned regional actors, reducing their ability to support Moscow elsewhere. As seen in Ukraine, the United States would likely supply weapons and technology while avoiding putting boots on the ground. Prolonged military instability in the Middle East, rather than swift resolution, would serve broader US strategic interests.
The end result of such conflicts would be transformative. Europe could emerge economically crippled, its industrial base damaged and its political unity weakened or perhaps shattered altogether. Russia would not collapse entirely, but it would likely be left impoverished, depopulated, and sidelined for decades under the weight of reconstruction and reparations.
In contrast, the United States and potentially to some extent the UK acting as America’s Preferred proxy in Europe would emerge as dominant powers in a reshaped geopolitical European order. With its rivals weakened and dependent, new revenue streams secured, and strategic influence expanded, America would once again demonstrate its historical pattern of entering wars late, profiting consistently, and shaping the peace to its advantage.
Whether this future comes to pass is uncertain. What is clear is that war, for some nations, has never been merely about victory, it has been about leverage, economics, and long-term dominance.