90 Days of Expectations

Following on from my previous post below is my quick but objective analysis of what a serious, credibility seeking Scottish independence coalition would be expected to do in the first 30 to 90 days after securing a 50%+1 mandate from Scottish voters, assuming no immediate legal recognition only a strong political mandate. This is framed around signal management courts, markets, civil servants, foreign governments, and the electorate all interpret early actions as indicators of intent and competence which will shape their possible reactions.

Overarching Constraint:

The dominant expectation would be restraint combined with momentum:

• Move fast enough to show that the vote has consequences
• Move cautiously enough to avoid illegality, capital flight, or administrative paralysis

Overreach in this window is more damaging than delay.

Days 1–10: Mandate Consolidation and Stabilisation

1. A formal declaration of a political mandate for Scottish independence.

• A single unified declaration acknowledging the vote result and its political meaning.
• An explicit commitment to an orderly and  lawful transition.
• The affirmation of protection of rights, contracts, pensions, and public services
• The declaration must avoid unilateral legal claims of independence from the UK.

Primarily this initial declaration is about reducing uncertainty not declaring independence with immediate effect.

2. An immediate request for engagement to the government of the United Kingdom

The coalition must send a formal request to open negotiations referencing:

• The electoral mandate
• Proposing a framework and timeline for negotiations
• They must publish the request and any response (or lack thereof)

Silence or refusal by the UK at this point becomes a political fact rather than speculation.

3. Market and Institutional reassurances must be given

Co-ordinated statements sent to the:

• Scottish Government finance officials (the Scottish government may be a separate entity at this point from the coalition due to it being a devolved British administration).
• Public sector pension administrators.
• Major employers and banks.

Explicit commitments must be made of:

• No abrupt fiscal changes
• No retroactive legal alterations
• Continuity of regulatory regimes during the transition

Failure to do this risks self-inflicted instability.

Days 10–30: Process Formalisation

4. The creation of negotiation and transition architecture

Expected steps include but not limited to:

• Establishing a Negotiation Authority (or equivalent)
• Thematic working groups (finance, defence, borders, welfare, etc.)

Naming lead negotiators with: 

• Cross-party legitimacy
• Technical credibility rather than partisan symbolism

The personnel choices matter more than the structure itself.

5. Legislative Process Launch (Not final Acts)

The introduction of process legislation, for example A Transition Bill

• Defining how negotiations are authorised
• Parliamentary oversight mechanisms
• Reporting and transparency requirements

Avoid attempting: 

• Immediate sovereignty claims
• Replacement of UK law on masse

This signals seriousness without constitutional provocation.

6. Legal Position Clarification

A consolidated legal position must be published:

• Acknowledging UK constitutional constraints
• State how the coalition interprets democratic legitimacy
• Outline escalation pathways if negotiations are blocked

Ambiguity here would invite judicial intervention later.

Days 30–60: Externalisation and Capacity Building

7. International Outreach (Structured, Not Performative)

Formal briefings (not recognition requests) to:

• EU institutions
• Neighbouring governments
• IMF, World Bank, OECD

With emphasis on: 

• Stability
• Continuity of obligations
• Willingness to negotiate in good faith

8. Economic and Fiscal Transparency

The coalition must publish, commission or release and explicitly identify: 

• A baseline fiscal position
• An initial transition budget outlook
• Independent economic assessments
• Known unknowns
• Areas requiring negotiation with the UK

Markets tend to punish concealment more than bad news.

9. Civil Service Transition Planning (Visible but Lawful)

Expansion of internal planning units: 

• Customs and trade administration
• Revenue collection
• Regulatory authorities
• Begin recruitment or secondment planning

This should be framed as contingency planning, not secession by stealth.

Days 60–90: Escalation Readiness and Democratic Reinforcement

10. Public Reporting and Democratic Check-In

The coalition must publish a “State of the Transition” report: 

• Progress on negotiations (or lack thereof)
• Risks and constraints
• Next phase decisions
• Parliamentary debate and vote reaffirming direction

This maintains legitimacy if timelines slip.

11. Conditional Escalation Planning

Without necessarily acting, the coalition would be expected to define thresholds for: 

• Possible further referendums (Future of the monarchy, EU membership)
• International arbitration attempts
• Enhanced autonomy legislation
• Clarify what it will not do unilaterally

Predictability here will reduce fear even among opponents.

12. Coalition Discipline Maintenance

During this time there must be robust internal discipline by the coalition:

• Enforce agreed messaging
• Prevent unilateral announcements by member parties or independent candidates
• Disputes resolved privately but within agreed structures.

Coalitions fail fastest in this phase.

What would be concerning?

In the first 90 days, red flags would include:

• Declaring independence without institutional readiness
• Failing to engage (or be seen to engage) with the UK government
• Mixed messages on currency, debt, or EU accession
• Using confrontation to substitute for process
• Treating international sympathy as a substitute for capacity

These undermine the coalition’s own mandate.

In Short

An objectively credible post-vote strategy in the first 30 to 90 days would prioritise:

• Stability over speed
• Process over proclamation
• Institutions over personalities

The goal in this window is not independence itself, but making independence plausible to actors who can either block or enable it.